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Abstract 
Recently a number of large-scale uncertainties have emerged as threats to the 
development of regional integration. Most notably, the UK has decided to leave the EU, 
and the new US president has stated that he would withdraw the US from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). This paper presents a quantitative comparison of the economic 
impacts of a number of alternative regional trade agreement (RTA) scenarios. The impacts 
were estimated using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade. It 
is estimated that the US would no longer gain and might even lose, if it withdraws from 
TPP. The benefits of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with Japan would be smaller than those of TPP. Higher tariffs on US 
imports from China and Mexico would lead to significant deterioration of the economic 
welfare of not only China and Mexico but also the US. Furthermore, China’s benefits 
from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) might be relatively 
limited depending on the levels of the agreement and weighed against the adverse impacts 
of the possible US tariffs. The UK economy would suffer as a result of BREXIT, but the 
cost of BREXIT could be smaller than the possible benefits of joining TPP. All in all, it 
has been shown that income gains resulting from non-tariff measure (NTM) reductions 
are much larger than those arising from tariff removals. Global best efforts are required 
to achieve higher level RTAs and the resulting larger economic benefits. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
 Anti-globalization and protectionist movements have emerged world-wide. The 
UK has decided to leave the EU as a result of the EU referendum vote of June 2016. 
Newly elected US President Trump in November 2016 has said that he would withdraw 
the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and proposed the imposition of higher 
tariffs on US imports from China and Mexico. Uncertainty has risen to an alarming degree 
with regard to the development of regional integration. Under this atmosphere of great 
uncertainty, in the realm of trade policy, clarification of the relative significance of 
alternative regional trade agreement (RTA) scenarios is urgently needed. 
 
 In fact, the present is a crucially decisive time in the progress of bilateral and 
multi-regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs), which has been accelerating since the beginning of 2013. In the Asia-Pacific 
region, the first round of the China-Japan-Korea FTA negotiations was held in March 
2013. In addition, the first round of formal negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) took place in May. Japan joined TPP negotiations in July 
(Chart 1). Meanwhile, the three largest advanced economies – the US, the EU and Japan 
– have commenced negotiations towards a giant triangle of EPAs. Negotiations for both 
a Japan-EU EPA and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) were also 
launched. 
 
 This paper presents a quantitative comparison of the economic impacts of several 
possible RTA scenarios. The impacts were estimated using a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade incorporating the dynamic effects of capital 
accumulation and pro-competitive productivity improvement. RTA measures will 
stimulate trade by lowering prices of tradable goods, leading to increased market access 
for trading partners and increased national output for exporting countries. Meanwhile, the 
efficiency of use of domestic production resources in importing countries will be 
enhanced. This combination of effects is expected to result in the expansion of production 
and increased income and welfare. 
 
 The remaining chapters of this paper are organized as follows. In Chapter 2, after 
a review of TPP impact studies and updates, the economic impacts of alternative scenarios 
are compared. In Chapter 3, the impacts of the trade policy proposed by the new US 
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president will be examined and compared with those of RCEP. Chapter 4 discusses the 
impacts of BREXIT and the alternative RTA scenarios for the UK. Conclusions are 
presented in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 II. Impacts of TPP and alternative scenarios 
 
 1. Assessment of TPP studies 
 
 TPP negotiations were concluded in October 2015 and the TPP Agreement was 
signed in February 2016. The economic impacts of TPP have been studied in numerous 
articles.1 Several TPP governments have assessed the impact towards the ratification of 
the TPP Agreement. 
- The Malaysia Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) conducted 
a cost-benefit analysis in December 2015 (MITI (2015)). 
- The Japan Cabinet Secretariat released its economic impact analysis in 
December 2015 (Cabinet Secretariat (2015)). 
- The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) released its 
National Interest Analysis (NIA), based on previous research by academic 
                                                   
1 A comprehensive survey of those studies is available in Gilbert et al. (2016). It should be noted 
that many of those studies are relatively hypothetical ones assuming TPP policy scenarios 
analyzed before the conclusion of negotiations. 
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experts, in January 2016 (MFAT (2016)). 
- The Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported to 
parliament on NIA in February 2016, citing an economic analysis by World 
Bank (WB (2016)). 
- The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) reported on its 
economic impact analysis to congress and the president in May 2016 (USITC 
(2016)). 
- Global Affairs Canada (GAC) released its economic impact analysis in 
September 2016 (GAC (2016)). 
 
 Even after the TPP negotiations were concluded, the policy scenarios studied by 
TPP governments and others differed in some respects. In addition to the impacts of tariff 
removals, the Japan Cabinet Secretariat estimated the impacts of the improvements in 
logistics performance. GAC, Malaysia MITI, New Zealand MFAT, USITC and WB all 
included the impacts of the reductions of non-tariff measures (NTMs) in goods and 
barriers in services. USITC and WB also included the impacts of investment liberalization. 
In addition, GAC and WB considered the effects of Rules of Origin (ROO). Meanwhile, 
the Japan Cabinet Secretariat incorporated the impacts of counter policy measures 
including (a) expansion of the exports of agriculture commodities, (b) support for the 
activities of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and (c) stimulation of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). 
 
 Moreover, estimations of the macroeconomic impacts of TPP varied in size 
depending on the dynamic mechanism incorporated in CGE model simulations. One such 
mechanism was the effects of the labor market. The Japan Cabinet Secretariat and USITC 
incorporated endogenous labor supply in response to real wage hikes. The Cabinet 
Secretariat (2015) indicated that the estimated economic impacts of TPP could be around 
two times larger by the effects of labor supply, which are not included in the vast majority 
of standard CGE model simulations.2 
 
 Another potential mechanism is the inclusion of the effects of trade liberalization 
on the “extensive margin” of trade, that is, exports by companies not involved in 
international markets before liberalization. This approach would invoke heterogeneous-
firms trade theory, in contrast to the country-differentiated-goods approaches taken in past 
studies. Petri et al. (2012), a contributor to WB (2016), has pointed out that “simulations 
that limit the application of this new theoretical structure produce income gains that are 
                                                   
2 Cabinet Secretariat (2015) has also incorporated the productivity improvements according to 
the rising share of trade in domestic production markets. 
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41 per cent lower.” 
 
 That said, the key point here is that all CGE model estimates have indicated 
sustainable income gains from TPP.3 The effects of macroeconomic policy measures, 
including monetary easing and fiscal stimulus, disappear when those expansionary policy 
measures will be returned to business as usual. On the other hand, the impacts of structural 
reform measures, including those resulting from RTAs thorough more efficient resource 
allocation and productivity improvements, will likely be sustainable over the medium- 
and long-term horizon. 
 
 2. Updates of TPP impact estimates 
 
 One notable feature of recent mega RTAs including TPP is that numerous 
bilateral and sub-regional agreements are already in place in the member economies. As 
a matter of fact, 42 out of 66 potential bilateral agreements among 12 TPP member 
countries have been implemented and/or are being implemented (Table 1). Therefore, in 
order to estimate the economic impacts of tariff reductions under the newly agreed RTAs, 
it is necessarily to distinguish those effects from the effects of existing agreements. 
 
 In this study, the economic impacts of RTAs are estimated using the Global Trade 
                                                   
3 Capaldo J. and A. Izurieta (2016) has found that the benefits of TPP to economic growths are 
negative for the US and Japan using the United Nations Global Policy Model. However, the policy 
scenarios studied must be qualified. The adverse outcomes are self-apparent assuming 
government expenditure cuts according to the implementation of TPP. 
 AUS BRN CAN CHL JPN MYS MEX NZL PER SIN USA VNM
Australia - Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y
Brunei Y - N Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y
Canada N N - Y N N Y N Y N Y N
Chile Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Japan Y Y N Y - Y Y N Y Y N Y
Malaysia Y Y N Y Y - N Y N Y N Y
Mexico N N Y Y Y N - N Y N Y N
New Zealand Y Y N Y N Y N - N Y N Y
Peru N N Y Y Y N Y N - Y Y N
Singapore Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y - Y Y
US Y N Y Y N N Y N Y Y - N
Viet Nam Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y N -
Source: Database on Preferential Trade Arrangements, WTO
Note: Y indicates for RTAs existing and N for not existing.
Table 1 Existing RTAs among TPP countries
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Analysis Project (GTAP) Data Base version 9. 4  Moreover, the estimated economic 
impacts of tariff reductions according to the TPP Agreement have been updated based on 
International Trade Centre datasets (ITC 2015, 2016)5 prepared for the Global EPAs 
Research Consortium,6 following GAC (2016), Cabinet Secretariat (2015) and USITC 
(2016). This updating will provide the most accurate estimates in the above regard. 
 
 Macroeconomic impacts of TPP tariff reductions7 are compared in Table 2. 
Average real GDP in TPP countries is estimated to increase by 0.15 per cent as a result of 
the TPP Agreement, in addition to the increase resulting from the implementation of 
existing RTAs (0.10 per cent). Meanwhile, TPP countries could still enjoy real GDP gains 
from tariff reductions (0.05 per cent) other than those resulting from the TPP Agreement. 
 
 The relative importance of existing RTAs, the TPP Agreement and other tariff 
reductions vary among TPP countries, reflecting the different states of existing RTAs. 
                                                   
4 The data for Brunei is newly available in the version 9 database. 
5 The GTAP database is the most common basis for CGE model simulations. The current version 
9 Data Base has been benchmarked to the year in 2011, providing levels of tariff data for that year 
including those already scheduled for reduction in past trade agreements but not implemented as 
of 2011. ITC datasets have firstly been updated to 2014 and incorporated further tariff reduction 
schedules according to existing RTAs among TPP countries after that year. 
6 It was established in June 2013 and has facilitated trade policy decision making by assembling 
high quality information and quantitative studies on the potential impacts of EPAs. The Secretariat 
is located at GRIPS. http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~GlobalEPAsResearchConsortium/en/about/ 
7 Economic welfare is measured better by equivalent variation (EV) incorporating the terms of 
trade effects. That said, macroeconomic impacts are shown by real GDP in this paper, which looks 
much more familiar to policy makers. 
(%)
Existing RTAs TPP Other
Australia 0.17 -0.03 0.18
Brunei 5.20 -0.23 -0.11
Canada 0.00 0.50 0.08
Chile 0.28 -0.12 -0.09
Japan 0.23 0.24 0.20
Malaysia 1.99 0.91 -0.03
Mexico 0.26 -0.19 0.03
New Zealand 0.04 0.71 0.05
Peru 0.07 -0.05 -0.03
Singapore 0.60 0.04 -0.02
US 0.01 0.05 0.02
Viet Nam 1.37 6.79 -0.06
TPP countries 0.10 0.15 0.05
Source: Author's simulations 
Table 2 Real GDP gains by TPP tariff reductions
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Four member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Brunei, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam, would largely gain from the implementation of 
existing RTAs. Canada, New Zealand, the US and Viet Nam would primarily benefit from 
TPP tariff reductions. Australia and Japan could still gain from other tariff reductions. On 
the other hand, Brunei, Chile, Mexico and Peru might not necessarily gain from additional 
tariff reductions under TPP. 
 
 The tariff concession ratios of the TPP Agreement were almost 100 per cent 
except in the case of Japan (95 per cent). Japan would maintain tariffs and tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQs) on the so-called five sacred commodities, rice, wheat, sugar, dairy 
products and meat. That said, this ratio has been higher than in Japan’s previous EPAs, at 
around 90 per cent. Indeed, the effective differences in the economic impacts would be 
much larger than 90 to 100 per cent. Tariff concessions are often measured by tariff lines 
in terms of the numbers of commodities in each tariff classification. However, reductions 
in trade weighted average rates of tariffs and simple total tariff payments, though 
meaningful in economics, are not necessarily proportional to reductions in the number of 
commodities. The remaining commodities will likely be subject to higher than average 
tariffs. In fact, average protection rates on Japanese imports from TPP countries will be 
reduced by 56 per cent, from 2.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent, by the TPP Agreement. 
 
 3. The impacts of alternative scenarios of TPP 
 
 Newly elected US president Trump has said that he would withdraw the US from 
TPP and negotiate bilateral FTAs. As discussed in PIIE (2016), there is concern that “if 
he imposes the trade restrictions of the magnitudes threatened, foreign countries will soon 
retaliate. They will not patiently wait for the US court proceedings or the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) litigation to vindicate their rights under national or international law. 
Enormous economic damage will ensue long before the legal battlefield is cleared.” 
 
 According to the TPP Agreement, TPP could go into force once six countries 
ratify it, if those countries account for more than 85 per cent of the total GDP of the TPP 
countries. This means that TPP itself cannot be implemented without the US’s ratification. 
That said, it will still be useful to look at the hypothetical economic impacts of the 
implementation of the contents of the TPP Agreement by the eleven TPP countries 
without the US, as a possible reference scenario. Those economic impacts could also be 
compared with that of the US’ bilateral FTA/EPA with Japan, a major TPP country from 
the US perspective, given its bilateral and regional FTAs with other TPP countries. 
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 Real GDP gains of TPP countries under the above alternative scenarios are 
compared in Table 3. If the US did not join TPP, the US would no longer gain and might 
even lose as a result of the tariff reductions of the other TPP countries. The other TPP 
countries would gain more or less depending on the relative significance of income and 
price effects within those trade structures. Australia, Brunei, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru and Singapore would gain more since they would no longer have to compete with 
the US in the export markets (price effects). On the other hand, Canada, Japan, Malaysia 
and Viet Nam would gain less as a result of losing US export markets (income effects). 
 
 The real GDP gains by the US and Japan as a result of the bilateral tariff 
reductions between the two countries under the tariff reduction schedules of the TPP 
Agreement would be somewhat smaller than the gains from TPP in the two countries. The 
US and Japan are the two largest economies among TPP countries and already have 
FTAs/EPAs in place with major trade partners. The two countries could be expected to 
enjoy exclusive trade creation effects under higher levels of tariff reductions without 
significant trade diversion effects with the rest of TPP countries. However, the income 
gains of the US and Japan under TPP would be larger as a result of the wider trade markets 
in TPP countries as a whole, according to estimates based on the framework of model 
simulations in this paper.8 
 
                                                   
8 The income gains of the US and Japan resulting from full tariff removals between the two 
countries beyond the TPP Agreement could be larger than estimated here. However, that scenario 
may not necessarily be realistic in the near future, as discussed above. 
(%)
TPP TPP11 JA-US TPP TPP11 JA-US
Australia -0.03 0.07 -0.05 1.11 1.11 -0.01
Brunei -0.23 0.06 -0.10 7.97 7.97 -0.19
Canada 0.50 0.25 -0.04 1.48 0.80 0.17
Chile -0.12 0.06 -0.05 0.89 0.86 0.03
Japan 0.24 0.07 0.22 1.13 1.04 0.85
Malaysia 0.91 0.24 -0.04 22.57 20.41 0.09
Mexico -0.19 0.16 -0.12 9.19 5.47 0.33
New Zealand 0.71 0.89 -0.10 3.56 3.41 0.04
Peru -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.85 0.72 0.01
Singapore 0.04 0.13 -0.03 15.93 14.58 0.09
US 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.72 0.15 0.35
Viet Nam 6.79 1.10 -0.06 10.90 9.29 0.16
TPP countries 0.15 0.05 0.04 1.73 1.09 0.38
Source: Author's simulations 
Tariff reductions NTMs reductions
Table 3 Real GDP gains under alternative TPP scenarios
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 TPP is a landmark 21st-century agreement, setting a new standard for global 
trade while addressing next-generation issues. The TPP Agreement consists of 30 
chapters on topics including E-commerce, government procurement, intellectual property, 
labor and environment, as well as tariffs on trade in goods (Table 4). Larger economic 
impacts are expected from NTM reductions and liberalization of services and investment, 
particularly in advanced economies where tariffs have already been reduced. 
 
 Real GDP gains resulting from NTM reductions in trade in goods and services 
are also compared in Table 3, assuming 50 per cent NTM reductions with 50 per cent 
spillover effects9 to third countries.10 This means that NTMs in TPP countries will be 
reduced by 25 per cent for imports from non-TPP countries.11 Data on the ad-valorem 
equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs are guided by the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(OTRI) provided by WB (2012).12 
 
 All TPP countries would enjoy macroeconomic income gains as a result of 
possible NTM reductions. Moreover, the estimated real GDP gains of TPP countries 
resulting from NTM reductions (1.73 per cent) are more than ten times those from tariff 
reductions (0.15 per cent) on average. The relative significance of such gains would vary 
among TPP countries, reflecting relative differences in tariff levels and the AVEs of 
                                                   
9 This degree of spillover effects was assumed following EC (2012). 
10 Many NTMs relate to differences in regulations, which mostly cannot be altered on a purely 
bilateral basis. Once addressed, they will improve market access for third countries as well. 
Therefore, to a large extent, NTM reductions operate on a most favored nation (MFN) basis. 
11 This methodology remains unchanged from that employed in Kawasaki (2014, 2015). 
12 See Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008, 2009) for the empirical methodology and the outcomes. 
1. Initial provisions and general definitions 16. Competition
2. National treatment and market access for goods 17. State-owned enterprises
3. Rules of origin and origin procedures 18: Intellectual property
4. Textiles and apparel 19. Labour
5. Customs administration and trade facilitation 20. Environment
6. Trade remedies 21. Cooperation and capacity building
7. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 22. Competitiveness and business facilitation
8. Technical Barriers to Trade 23. Development
9. Investment 24. Small and medium-sized enterprises
10. Cross border trade in services 25. Regulatory coherence
11. Financial services 26. Transparency and anti-corruption
12. Temporary entry for business persons 27. Administrative and institutional provisions
13. Telecommunications 28. Dispute settlement
14. Electronic commerce 29. Exceptions
15. Government procurement 30. Final provisions
Source: TPP full text, United Staes Trade Representative
Table 4 TPP chapters
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NTMs. Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Viet Nam could still gain substantially from 
tariff reductions. On the other hand, it has been suggested that Malaysia, Singapore and 
the US would see much more significant gains from NTM reductions. As emphasized in 
Kawasaki (2014, 2015), it must be noted that what is essential to realize income gains by 
NTM reductions is own NTM reductions rather than those by trade partners in TPP and 
RTAs. 
 
 If the US does not join TPP, it may still gain by spillover effects of NTM 
reductions by the other TPP countries, but the gain would be limited. On the other hand, 
real GDP gains of the other eleven TPP countries would not be so much smaller in 
comparison with the relevant differences in impacts of tariff reductions. The real GDP 
gains of the US and Japan from NTM reductions by the bilateral FTA/EPA would be 
smaller than those from TPP due to smaller coverage of NTM reductions. Japan could 
still gain 80 per cent of the gains possible under TPP. However, the US real GDP gains 
would be a half of those under TPP, reflecting the relatively smaller share of Japan in the 
US trade market in TPP countries. The US accounts for 45 per cent of Japan’s import 
markets from TPP countries. On the other hand, Japan accounts for 17 per cent of US 
import markets from TPP countries. 
 
 These are still hypothetical estimates for the purpose of comparison of the 
economic impacts of possible scenarios. The assessment of actual detailed outcomes of 
the TPP Agreement must be left for future studies. The above assumption of 50 per cent 
reductions in NTMs could be optimistic given the numbers of laws to be amended13 for 
implementation of the TPP Agreement. In Japan, in addition to Temporary Tariff 
Measures Law for the reduction of tariffs, the following five laws have been amended in 
the Diet. 
 Copyright Law: Extension of copyright periods 
 Patent Law: Extension of patent right periods 
 Trademark Law: Compensation for the unauthorized use of trademarks 
 Pharmaceutical Affairs Law: Registration of certification organization 
 Competition Law: Voluntary resolution of violation of the law 
 
 On the other hand, the assumption of 50 per cent14 spillover effects of NTM 
                                                   
13 In addition to amendments to laws, other amendments are made in the government and ministry 
ordinances. The number of such laws and other instruments amended varies across TPP countries 
depending on the current state of NTMs. 
14  Malaysia MITI assumed 50 per cent spillover effects in calculations following the 
methodology in Kawasaki (2014) and Kawasaki (2015). WB (2016) assumed 20 per cent. On the 
other hand, USITC (2016) does not include spillover effects. 
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reductions could be conservative. The registration of certification organizations under 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law will be limited to those in TPP countries, but the amendment 
of the other laws, including the extension of intellectual properties rights, could be applied 
on a MFN basis. The magnitude of spillover effects of NTM reductions as a whole would 
then be much larger. 
 
 
 III. Impacts of US tariffs and RCEP 
 
 1. The impacts of tariffs on China and Mexico 
 
 New US President Trump has also proposed to impose tariffs on imports from 
China and Mexico. This study assumes that the US would impose a 45 per cent tariff on 
nonoil imports from China and a 35 per cent tariff on nonoil imports from Mexico, 
following PIIE (2016). In addition, two scenarios are compared: an asymmetric scenario 
in which China and Mexico do not retaliate; and a symmetric scenario in which China 
and Mexico respond symmetrically, imposing the same tariffs on imports from the US. 
 
 If the US imposes import tariffs, the US will likely lose rather than gain at the 
macroeconomic level. The US real GDP is estimated to decrease by 1.72 per cent under 
a 45 per cent import tariff imposed on China and 0.52 per cent under a 35 per cent import 
tariff imposed on Mexico (Table 5). The magnitude would be larger for imports from 
China primarily reflecting the larger imports from China, which occupies a 17 per cent 
share of the total imports of the US, than for imports from Mexico, which occupies around 
10 per cent. Meanwhile, the US does not import oil from China. On the other hand, oil 
imports occupy around 10 per cent of US imports from Mexico. If China and Mexico 
would retaliate imposing the same tariffs on imports from the US, the US would lose 
more but only to a limited extent since US exports to the two countries are smaller than 
US imports from them. US exports to China are around 30 per cent of US imports from 
(%)
Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric
US -1.72 -1.99 -0.52 -0.80
China -2.51 -3.03 0.20 0.37
Mexico 5.19 5.57 -17.95 -26.91
Canada 0.61 0.82 0.27 0.40
Japan 0.41 0.62 0.13 0.29
World -0.45 -0.47 -0.40 -0.51
Source: Author's simulations
Tariffs on China Tariffs on Mexico
Table 5 Changes in real GDP under US tariffs
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China. US exports to Mexico account for 65 per cent of US imports from Mexico. 
 
 China and Mexico, in particular, would lose much more than the US, relatively, 
because of higher shares of exports to the US. The US occupies about 73 per cent of the 
Mexican export market and around 22 per cent of the Chinese export market. On the other 
hand, neighboring economies might gain rather than lose from the bilateral import tariffs 
between the US and China (and also Mexico) due to trade diversion effects. It is 
noteworthy that the estimated magnitudes of real GDP gains in Japan, Canada and Mexico 
from US tariffs on imports from China will be larger than their gains from TPP tariff 
reductions. That said, it must be noted that it is estimated that the total real global GDP 
will decrease rather than increase. 
 
 A greater concern will be the impacts at the sector levels. According to current 
estimates, an import tariff on China would lead to an increase in US production in the 
textiles/apparels and other manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, US production 
would not necessarily increase in any sectors as a result of an import tariff on Mexico. 
Meanwhile, US production would decrease relatively more in the chemicals and auto 
sectors if China retaliates and in the textiles/apparels, chemicals and auto sectors in the 
case of Mexican retaliation. 
 
 2. The impacts of RCEP 
 
 The development of RCEP negotiations has been a matter of great concern as 
another major vehicle of mega regional integration in the Asia-Pacific, given the 
emerging uncertainties related to the near future implementation of TPP. China’s role in 
the economic order has also been a focus of discussion, since China as a key leader among 
RCEP member countries, especially since the US is not yet a member. 
 
 RCEP negotiations began in 2013. In the meantime, 115 out of 120 possible 
combinations of bilateral trade agreements in East Asia were already covered by 
concluded or implemented FTAs/EPAs. The remaining five combinations are Australia-
India, China-India, India-New Zealand, Japan-China and Japan-Korea. However, as 
discussed in Kawasaki et al. (2016), these FTAs/EPAs in East Asia have not resulted in 
100 per cent removal of tariffs and much remains to be done in RCEP negotiations. 
 
 In this paper, the economic impacts of three hypothetical scenarios are estimated 
to support examination of the possible range of economic impacts reflecting the levels of 
achievement in RCEP negotiations. The RCEP Agreement may allow some exemptions 
from tariff removal. The actual economic impacts must be reviewed after the negotiations 
13 
 
concluded. 
Tariff all: 100 per cent removal of tariffs among RCEP countries 
Tariff and NTMs: 100 per cent removal of tariffs among RCEP countries and 50 
per cent NTM reductions by RCEP countries with 50 per cent spillover effects 
Tariff five: 100 per cent removal of tariffs between the five bilateral combinations 
above 
 
 If RCEP countries eliminate all imports tariffs that existed as of 2011,15 the 
average real GDP of RCEP countries would be boosted by 1.89 per cent (Table 616). The 
per cent magnitude of real GDP gains varies widely across the RCEP countries, ranging 
from 0.80 per cent in China to 18.14 per cent in Cambodia. Smaller countries would enjoy 
larger gains in terms of the rate of changes. Meanwhile, macroeconomic gains would be 
more than double (4.19 per cent) if RCEP countries reduce NTMs as well as removing 
tariffs.17 
                                                   
15 This means that tariff reductions according to existing EPAs/FTAs among RCEP countries are 
not distinguished in the current simulations. A preliminary study of tariff concessions in East Asia 
is discussed in Kawasaki et al. (2016). Moreover, ITC has worked on tariff reduction schedules 
for EPAs/FTAs in East Asia, extending the scope of earlier studies on TPP countries, as discussed 
above. 
16 The data for Myanmar is not available in the current GTAP Dara Base version 9. 
17 The impacts of NTM reductions in Korea may be underestimated due to the current poor 
measurement of NTMs in Korea. 
(%)
Tariff all Tariff+NTMs Tariff five
Australia 1.40 2.98 0.12
Brunei 5.82 15.43 -0.17
Cambodia 18.14 33.00 -0.49
China 0.80 1.96 0.39
India 2.51 4.49 1.14
Indonesia 1.98 3.46 -0.20
Japan 1.50 2.88 1.24
Korea 5.95 6.91 0.30
Lao 5.50 11.88 -0.10
Malaysia 5.32 32.46 -0.47
New Zealand 1.81 5.91 0.00
Philippines 1.38 15.89 -0.47
Singapore 2.54 20.60 -0.38
Thailand 11.25 16.45 -0.89
Viet Nam 11.21 26.45 -0.62
RCEP countries 1.89 4.19 0.51
US -0.18 -0.16 -0.07
Source: Author's simulations 
Table 6 Real GDP gains by RCEP measures
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 If RCEP negotiations do not lead to agreement on further tariff reductions 
beyond the existing FTAs/EPAs among RCEP countries, i.e. if only tariffs between the 
five remaining combinations of countries above are removed, income gains of RCEP 
countries would also be limited. Japan and India would be key contributors to further 
tariff reductions in RCEP countries and would enjoy relatively larger real GDP gains. 
Australia, China, Korea and New Zealand would also gain from further tariff reductions, 
though to a lesser extent. On the other hand, ASEAN countries would lose rather than 
gain from additional tariff reductions due to trade diversion effects. Further efforts by 
ASEAN countries would be essential for ASEAN countries to enjoy economic benefits 
from RCEP. 
 
 Current simulations estimate that China’s real GDP would increase by 0.80 per 
cent as a result of all tariff removals among RCEP countries and by 1.96 per cent from 
additional NTM reductions. These magnitudes might not be larger than possible real GDP 
losses caused by the 45 per cent tariff on US imports from China, ranging from 2.51 to 
3.03 per cent, discussed above. Serious efforts to achieve more ambitious goals in the 
RCEP Agreement are recommended in light of the possible headwinds from near future 
US trade policy making. 
 
 The estimated US real GDP losses from RCEP tariff reductions (0.07 - 0.18 per 
cent) due to trade diversion effects are much larger than those resulting from US 
withdrawal from TPP (0.01 per cent). The US could gain from spillover effects of NTM 
reductions by RCEP countries, but the magnitude of such a gain would not be large 
enough to offset the adverse impacts of tariff reductions among RCEP countries. The cost 
of US exit from global trends of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation will 
be higher from Asia-Pacific and global perspectives. 
 
 TPP and RCEP have been two key pathways to the establishment of the Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), an eventual goal of comprehensive Asia-Pacific 
regional integration. It is important to note that, as discussed in Kawasaki (2014 2015),18 
China would generate the largest income gains among the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) economies by FTAAP, for two main reasons (Chart 219). First, China 
is one of the two major economies in the Asia-Pacific along with the US. Second, China’s 
tariff rates and the AVEs of NTMs have been higher than those of other countries, in 
                                                   
18 Updated estimates of the economic impacts of TPP, RCEP and FTAAP are provided in the 
Annex. 
19 The data for Papua New Guinea (PNG) is not available in the current version of the GTAP 
database. 
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particular the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
nations. The role of China’s EPA policy measures in RCEP and subsequently in FTAAP 
will be quite important in terms of economic benefits for the Asia-Pacific economies. 
 
 
 IV. The impacts of BREXIT 
 
 BREXIT has generated considerable uncertainty to the work to develop regional 
integration and the world economy. The economic impacts of BREXIT will entirely be 
dependent on the border measures introduced between the UK and the remaining EU, 
which are not yet clearly defined. Estimates of the economic impacts of BREXIT vary 
widely among earlier studies as a result of “significantly different methods, assumptions 
and aspects included” (Busch and Matthes, 2016). 
 
 In this paper, the economic impacts of two possible scenarios in import tariffs 
are estimated using the same version of the CGE model used in the earlier chapters. One 
scenario involves the introduction of WTO MFN tariff rates, guided by the current 
average tariff rates of the UK and the EU on imports from the rest of the EU. The other 
scenario involves the introduction of tariff rates following the rate behavior between the 
EU and Norway and the EU and Switzerland. Those two countries are not members of 
the EU, and import tariffs between them and the EU remain in the agriculture, forestry, 
and fisheries sectors and processed-food industries. 
 
 If WTO MFN rates are introduced at the new EU-UK border, the real GDP of 
the UK is estimated to decrease by 0.93 per cent. This magnitude would be smaller (0.18 
Source: Author's simulations
Source: Author's simulations
Chart 2 Contributions to real GDP gains by FTAAP measures
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per cent), if tariffs were limited to practices related to Norway and Switzerland. On the 
other hand, the adverse impacts on the remaining EU would be around a tenth of those in 
the UK, ranging from 0.03 to 0.13 per cent depending on the size of the tariffs introduced, 
reflecting the difference in the relative sizes of trade markets. The volume of exports and 
imports of the remaining EU as a whole is around ten times that of the UK. 
 
 After BREXIT, the UK could have access to a variety of RTAs. The possible 
economic impacts are compared in Table 7. It can be seen that the UK’s macroeconomic 
gains from removal of bilateral tariffs between the UK and Japan and the UK and the US 
would be limited, though slightly larger than those from Japan-EU EPA and TTIP. 
However, that gain could more than offset the adverse impacts of BREXIT, if the UK 
were to join TPP. On the other hand, the adverse effect on the EU economy of trade 
diversion effects of the UK joining TPP would be larger than BREXIT. 
 
 The macroeconomic impacts of the above alternative scenarios on the US and 
Japanese economies are also compared in Table 7. After BREXIT, real GDP gains of the 
US and Japan by tariff removals with the EU would be around 15 per cent smaller than 
before BREXIT, reflecting the trade share of the UK in the EU. Meanwhile, the real GDP 
gains of the US and Japan resulting from bilateral tariff removals with the UK would be 
limited to around 15 per cent of those with the EU including the UK. 
 
 The relative differences among economic impacts by NTM reductions will no 
(%)
 UK EU Japan US
Tariff removals
Japan-EU EPA before BREXIT 0.05 0.07 0.26 -0.01
Japan-EU EPA after BREXIT -0.01 0.08 0.22 -0.01
Japan-UK EPA 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.00
TTIP before BREXIT 0.12 0.10 -0.08 0.14
TTIP after BREXIT -0.07 0.13 -0.06 0.12
UK-US FTA 0.19 -0.03 -0.02 0.02
UK joining TPP 0.35 -0.17 0.68 0.09
NTNs reductions
Japan-EU EPA before BREXIT 0.91 1.30 0.73 0.00
Japan-EU EPA after BREXIT 0.18 1.28 0.72 0.00
Japan-UK EPA 0.73 0.02 0.65 0.01
TTIP before BREXIT 1.05 1.37 -0.07 0.42
TTIP after BREXIT 0.16 1.37 -0.05 0.40
UK-US FTA 0.93 0.01 -0.01 0.33
UK joining TPP 1.22 0.01 1.12 0.73
Source: Author's simulations
Table 7 Real GDP changes by BREXIT and alternative scenarios
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longer be proportional to trade shares, due to possible spillover effects to third countries. 
Real GDP gains of the US and Japan from NTM reductions arising from bilateral trade 
agreements with the UK are estimated to generate around 80-85 per cent of gains with 
the EU. It must again be noted that the possible income gains by NTM reductions would 
be much larger than tariff removals regardless of BREXIT. 
 
 If the UK were to join TPP, the US, in particular, and Japan would be expected 
to benefit more. However, such thinking is based on the assumption that the US remains 
in TPP. The implementation of TPP is a first and necessary steps towards reaping the 
benefits of regional integration in the near future. 
 
 
 V. Conclusions 
 
 The economic impacts of the various RTA scenarios were estimated in this paper. 
Key policy implications for major economies are summarized below. 
 
- The US would benefit from TPP but once it withdraws from TPP, the US 
would no longer gain and might even lose (Table 8). The benefits from 
bilateral FTA/EPA with Japan would be smaller than those from TPP. The 
high tariffs on imports from China and Mexico proposed by the new US 
president Trump would lead to significant deterioration of the economic 
welfare of the US. In the meantime, the adverse trade diversion effects of 
RCEP would be relatively larger for the US economy. The US is strongly 
recommended to remain in the global efforts towards trade and investment 
liberalization and facilitation in order to enjoy the related economic benefits. 
(%)
Tariffs NTMs reductions Total
TPP 0.05 0.72 0.77
Japan-US EPA 0.03 0.35 0.38
UK join TPP 0.07 0.73 0.80
TTIP 0.12 0.40 0.52
US-UK FTA 0.02 0.33 0.36
TPP11 -0.01 0.15 0.14
RCEP -0.18 0.03 -0.16
Japan-EU EPA -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Tariffs on China -1.99 - -
Tariffs on Mexico -0.80 - -
Source: Author's simulations
Table 8 The US's real GDP changes: Summary
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- China would also lose seriously if the US were to impose a 45 per cent tariff 
on imports from China, either unilaterally or bilaterally. Chinese benefits 
from RCEP might be relatively be limited, depending on the agreement made. 
China and the RCEP countries are encouraged to make maximum efforts to 
achieve higher levels RTAs. 
 
- The UK would lose more or less from BREXIT but the cost of BREXIT could 
be smaller than the possible benefit of joining TPP as far as border tariff 
measures are concerned. 
 
 All in all, the income gains resulting from NTM reductions have been shown to 
be much larger than those resulting from tariff removals. In terms of the framework for 
future regional integration, it is advisable to pursue and even extend the TPP agreement, 
a landmark 21st-century agreement, and set a new standard for global trade while 
addressing next-generation issues. 
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Annex: The macroeconomic impacts of the Asia-Pacific EPAs: Updates 
 
 The earlier estimates on the macroeconomic impacts of the Asia-Pacific EPAs in 
Kawasaki (2014 2015) for following six scenarios are updated using the new GTAP 
version 9 Data Base benchmarked to 2011 from 2007 in the version 8. The baseline of 
macroeconomic data is also updated to 2015 from 2010. 
 1. Tariff removals in TPP countries 
 2. Tariff removals and NTM reductions in TPP countries 
 3. Tariff removals in RCEP countries 
 4. Tariff removals and NTM reductions in RCEP countries 
 5. Tariff removals in FTAAP economies 
 6. Tariff removals and NTM reductions in FTAAP economies 
 
 It is assumed that tariffs existed in 2011 will fully be removed without 
distinguishing the effects of existing EPAs. It is also assumed that NTMs are reduced by 
50 per cent with 50 per cent spillover effects to the third economies in the all three cases 
above. 
 
 The key observations remain broadly unchanged. 
- TPP and RCEP are shown to complement each other rather than be 
competitors toward the establishment of FTAAP. 
- Trade diversion effects will deteriorate the economic welfare of the non-
member economies of regional EPAs. 
- Larger economic benefits are expected from NTMs reductions in addition to 
tariff removals. 
 
 This estimate is to compare the relative significance of the potential economic 
impacts of EPAs. Actual impacts will be re-estimated after the negotiations concluded. 
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(%)
Tariff +NTMs Tariff +NTMs Tariff +NTMs
Both TPP and RCEP Economies 1.0 4.3 2.1 6.1 2.3 6.6
Australia 0.3 1.4 1.4 3.0 1.0 2.6
Brunei 3.6 11.6 5.8 15.4 5.5 14.8
Japan 0.7 1.8 1.5 2.9 1.7 3.3
Malaysia 2.9 25.5 5.3 32.5 5.9 35.4
New Zealand 0.9 4.4 1.8 5.9 1.7 6.1
Singapore 0.6 16.5 2.5 20.6 2.1 21.7
Viet Nam 8.1 19.0 11.2 26.5 14.8 31.4
Only TPP Economies 0.1 1.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 1.8
Canada 0.6 2.0 -0.1 0.0 0.6 2.2
Chile 0.1 0.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 1.4
Mexico 0.1 9.3 -0.5 -0.8 1.6 11.6
Peru 0.1 0.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 1.1
US 0.1 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 1.1
Only RCEP Economies -0.2 -0.3 1.8 3.5 2.0 3.5
Cambodia -1.6 -0.6 18.1 33.0 -6.4 -5.6
China -0.2 -0.3 0.8 2.0 1.5 3.0
India -0.2 -0.2 2.5 4.5 -0.8 -0.9
Indonesia -0.3 0.1 2.0 3.5 1.3 2.7
Korea -0.2 -0.4 5.9 6.9 8.1 8.9
Lao -0.1 0.2 5.5 11.9 0.4 0.7
Philippines -0.4 -0.1 1.4 15.9 2.0 18.1
Thailand -0.8 0.1 11.3 16.5 11.3 16.6
Other APEC Economies -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 2.4 6.2
Hong Kopng, China -0.2 0.6 -0.4 0.7 0.2 3.7
Chinese Taipei -0.2 -0.4 -1.5 -1.9 3.6 8.1
Russia -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 2.4 6.0
TPP Economies 0.3 2.0 0.3 1.3 0.8 2.9
RCEP Economies 0.1 1.0 1.9 4.2 2.1 4.4
APEC Economies 0.1 1.2 0.7 1.8 1.4 3.5
EU -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6
World 0.0 0.7 0.4 1.2 0.6 1.9
Source: Author's simulations
Annex Table Real GDP changes by the Asia-Pacific EPAs
TPP12 RCEP FTAAP
